Board Independence, Executive Overconfidence and Financial Leverage
Based on the managerial overconfidence hypothesis in behavioral corporate finance, the paper studies the effect of executive confidence on corporate financing decisions. The empirical results indicate that there is an obvious positive correlation between executive overconfidence and capital structure, executive overconfidence can enhances corporate financial leverage ratio. But board independence can curb executive overconfidence. the more independent board is, the more restrained executive overconfidence is, and the positive relationship between executive overconfidence and financial leverage is much weaker.
executive overconfidence capital structure financing decision board independence
Yan Yong -hai Kong Yu-sheng
School of Finance and Economics Jiangsu University 212013 School of Finance and Economics Jiangsu University 212013 Zhenjiang, China
国际会议
成都
英文
364-368
2010-07-09（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）