Board Independence, Executive Overconfidence and M&A Decision

摘要：

Using 2006—2007 462 company years M&A sample as well as 231 CEOs related data, we inspected company M&A decisions from the behavioral finances perspective. We make an empirical analysis on whether excessively self-confident CEOs are willing to undertake M&A. Using the change of stocks quantity owned by CEO as the measure standard of whether CEOs are excessively self-confident or not, we conduct a research on the above question. Our empirical analysis results indicate that the M&A wish of excessively self-confident president is high compared to non-overconfident president. But board independence can curb executive overconfidence, the more independent the board is, the more restrained executive overconfidence is, and the positive relationship between executive overconfidence and M&A is more weaker.

关键词： executives overconfidence m&a decision board independence

作者: Yan Yong -hai Kong Yu-sheng

作者单位: School of Finance and Economics Jiangsu University 212013 School of Finance and Economics Jiangsu University 212013 Zhenjiang, China

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: 2010 IEEE International Conference on Advanced Management Science(2010年IEEE高级管理科学国际会 IEEE ICAMS 2010)

会议地点: 成都

会议语种:英文

页码: 612-616

在线出版日期: 2010-07-09（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）