Evolutionary Game Analysis on Management of Knowledge Employee

摘要：

At present, by nsing qualitative methods, many scholars studied their motivation mechanisms and analyzed their motivation factor and processes from the perspective of behavior and psychology, but attempts to consider the interaction among the knowledge employees, between the knowledge employees and the enterprises have been very few. So, this paper establishes two evolutionary game models for studying motivation mechanisms of the knowledge employees under the assumptions that the enterprises and the knowledge employees all have bounded rationality. By using replicator dynamics equations, this paper analyses the strategy choice on the interaction between the knowledge employees and the enterprises, among the knowledge employees, and furthermore, discusses the evolutionary stability strategies of the knowledge employees and the enterprises.

关键词： evolutionary game replicator dynamics equations motivation mechanism knowledge employees

作者: Haishu Lu Li You Lin Tang Yunqing Yu

作者单位: School of Economics and Management Jiangsu Teachers University of Technology Changzhou 213001 China

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: The 2nd IEEE International Conference on Advanced Computer Control(第二届先进计算机控制国际会议 ICACC 2010)

会议地点: 沈阳

会议语种:英文

页码: 351-354

在线出版日期: 2010-03-27（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）