A Random Delay Design of Processor against Power Analysis Attacks
As an important implementation of Cryptographic algorithm, processor should be thought about the ability of resistant power attack. In this paper we show a processor architecture, which automatically detects the execution of the encryption algorithms, and interleaves the execution of cryptographic algorithm code with that of dummy instructions to reduce the correlations between the leakage and the inside operations, and thus make the statistic analysis infeasible. Experiment verifies the efficiency of the proposed method.
processor random instruction injection power analysis design technique
Hongfei Qu Jinfu Xu Yingjian Yan
Zhengzhou Institute of information technology, Zhengzhou 450004, China
国际会议
上海
英文
254-256
2010-11-01(万方平台首次上网日期,不代表论文的发表时间)