An Analysis of Gaming Between Corporate Behaviors and Different Environmental Policies
This paper attempts to analyze the process of gaming between government and businesses under two different environmental policies based on the model of dynamic game of complete information and as such come up with valuable conclusions in this regard. Then, the paper compares and elaborates on the two results, producing guidance for corporations to make optimal business (manufacturing) decisions and providing reference for government departments to find solutions for these policies in a sound and effective approach.
Pollution emission tax Emission criteria Dynamic game of complete information and Nash equilibrium
FU Zhongyuan WU Minna
School of Ethical Study, Southwest University for Nationalities, Chengdu, 610041
国际会议
2010 International Conference on Management Science and Engineering(2010年管理科学与工程国际学术研讨会)
成都
英文
280-285
2010-11-01（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）