An Empirical Research on the Principal-agent Relationship and Performance of State-owned Commercial Banks
In 2010, after the Agricultural Bank of China successfully being listed in Shanghai and Hong Kong, the four major state-owned banks all have implemented their shareholding reform. It starts a new chapter in Chinas financial reform. Under this particular environment, this paper, starting from the principalagent theory, chooses selected for the study of state-owned commercial banks as research objective and combine with the current situation of the system and its incentive mechanisms to discuss the existing problems in stated-owned commercial banks. We propose our research hypothesis based on the literatures and empirical researches, and conduct empirical study with the statistical data collected from the annual reports of 8 listed state-owned commercial banks from 2007 to 2009. The results show that: the incentive degree of stated-owned commercial banks to its senior managers is passive with the operating performance, and the degree of political objective carried by stated-owned commercial banks is negative with the operation only when the asset scale of the bank is less than a given critical value, otherwise, they will show a passive relationship. Ultimately, this article puts forward policy suggestions according to the previous theoretical analysis and empirical results based on the principal-agent analysis.
State-owned commercial banks principal-agent incentive mechanism
LIU Zhishuai GONG Qiguo
Graduate University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, China, 100190
国际会议
2010 International Conference on Management Science and Engineering(2010年管理科学与工程国际学术研讨会)
成都
英文
596-602
2010-11-01（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）