The Efficiency Loss of User Equilibrium with Linear Non-separable and Asymmetric Latency Functions
Selfish routing problem in which traffic demands are revealed in n sequential games in an online fashion is discussed in this paper. In each game, the new demands form a user equilibrium and their routing remain unchanged afterwards. The efficiency loss of user equilibrium is 4n/2n+2-c2n-(n-1)δ when c2 ≤ n+1/n, and is 4n2c2/(n+1)-(n-1)d2 when c2 > n+1/n if latency functions on the edges are linear non-separable and asymmetric, where c2=1,0=d=1 are the degree of asymmetry and the degree of adjacence of Jacobian matrix of latency functions.
Selfish routing User equilibrium Online problem Efficiency loss
Xiaoping Wu Feifeng Zheng Xiaoyu Long
School of Management Engineering, Xian University of Posts and Telecommunications Xian 710061 Chin School of Management, Xian Jiaotong University, Xian 710049 China The State Key Lab for Manufactur School of Management Engineering, Xian University of Posts and Telecommunications Xian 710061 Chin
国际会议
西安
英文
965-968
2010-08-07(万方平台首次上网日期,不代表论文的发表时间)