会议专题

The Efficiency Loss of User Equilibrium with Linear Non-separable and Asymmetric Latency Functions

Selfish routing problem in which traffic demands are revealed in n sequential games in an online fashion is discussed in this paper. In each game, the new demands form a user equilibrium and their routing remain unchanged afterwards. The efficiency loss of user equilibrium is 4n/2n+2-c2n-(n-1)δ when c2 ≤ n+1/n, and is 4n2c2/(n+1)-(n-1)d2 when c2 > n+1/n if latency functions on the edges are linear non-separable and asymmetric, where c2=1,0=d=1 are the degree of asymmetry and the degree of adjacence of Jacobian matrix of latency functions.

Selfish routing User equilibrium Online problem Efficiency loss

Xiaoping Wu Feifeng Zheng Xiaoyu Long

School of Management Engineering, Xian University of Posts and Telecommunications Xian 710061 Chin School of Management, Xian Jiaotong University, Xian 710049 China The State Key Lab for Manufactur School of Management Engineering, Xian University of Posts and Telecommunications Xian 710061 Chin

国际会议

2010 International Conference of Informationa Science and Management Engineering(2010年信息科学与管理工程国际学术会议 ISME 2010)

西安

英文

965-968

2010-08-07(万方平台首次上网日期,不代表论文的发表时间)