An Evolutionary Game Model for the Risk Management Cooperation among the Project Participants
An evolutionary game model for the risk management cooperation of owner and contractor is presented. Using this model, the parameters that bring to the evolutionary system are analyzed, and the rule of the cooperation between owner and contractor is illustrated. It is indicated that cooperation cost and distributing mechanism for loss or profit are the key factors influencing cooperation among the project participants.
Risk Management Evolutionary Game Cooperation
Zhang Guo-jun Gao Yun-li
Faculty of Infrastructure Engineering, Dalian University of Technology, Liaoning Dalian, PRC Department of Civil Engineering and Architecture, Dalian Nationalities University, Liaoning Dalian,P
国际会议
The 1st International Conference on Sustainable Construction & Risk Management(首届可持续建设与风险管理国际会议)
重庆
英文
30-34
2010-06-12(万方平台首次上网日期,不代表论文的发表时间)