Suppliers-Manufacturers Cooperative Innovation Payment Contract Design

摘要：

On the model of bilateral Moral Hazard the cooperative product innovation and payment contract design in the supply chain have been studied. The effort of the suppliers and the manufacturers under the Moral Hazard-free condition always exceeds that when the Moral Hazard exists. Meanwhile, in the payment contract design under the Moral Hazard condition, the two involved parties profit transfer is realized through suppliers offering of the interim product price to manufacturers. According to the products observable ultimate market demand, the optimal payment contract design is constructed under the bilateral Moral Hazard from the perspective of suppliers. In the payment contract, the distribution ratio of both parties marginal profit is in ratio to each partys effort.

关键词： supply chain payment contract bilateral Moral Hazard cooperative innovation sufficient information

作者: Wu Gang Huang Jun Wu Bing-shan

作者单位: School of Economics and Business Administration, Southwest University, China School of Economics and School of Economics and Business Administration, Southwest University, China School of Economics and Business Administration,Chongqing University, China

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: The 1st International Conference on Sustainable Construction & Risk Management(首届可持续建设与风险管理国际会议)

会议地点: 重庆

会议语种:英文

页码: 1348-1355

在线出版日期: 2010-06-12（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）