Research of Knowledge-Workers Team Cooperation Based on Fairness Preference
Being different from the standard team theories with the hypothesis of absolutely selfish workers, this thesis, by using the fairness preference theory set by Fehr & Schmidt for reference, sets the team theory model with the workers fairness preference to research the Knowledge-workers team incentive mechanism. It is shown that workers intrinsic fairness preference can stimulate the Knowledge-workers team productions to the equilibrium of team cooperation without extrinsic supervisor when teams involve free-rider problems. This conclusion can provide some theoretical guidance and beneficial insights for solving the workers free-rider problems in knowledge-workers team cooperation.
Fairness preference Knowledge-workers Team cooperation
Li Xun Xian Peng Zhu Juqin
Sichuan International Studies University, Chongqing, China 400031
国际会议
The 1st International Conference on Sustainable Construction & Risk Management(首届可持续建设与风险管理国际会议)
重庆
英文
1425-1430
2010-06-12(万方平台首次上网日期,不代表论文的发表时间)