Political Interaction, Public Groups and Project Decision-making on Energy-Intensive Industries
This paper develops a game model that highlights pollution externalities (on welfare and production) and market imperfections of energy-intensive industries, and uses it to discuss the growth impact of both the ex-ante and the ex-post environmental policies. From the perspective of interest group theory, we analyze the influences of governments environmental policies and public participation to the pollution activities of enterprises, and the way interests groups affect government decision-making on energy projects. In addition, this article also provides some advice for public interest groups about how to participate in government decision-making legally in the process of social renovation in China.
interest group energy-intensive industries project management game analysis
Zhuoya You Xiangrong Jin Jie Zhang
Zhejiang University Hangzhuo China
国际会议
武汉
英文
534-539
2010-06-06（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）