Game Analysis on Construction Quality Risk Supervision Based on Collusion Behavior

摘要：

By setting up the game model of utility function, this paper conducts game analysis based on the collusion behavior at the expense of damaging construction quality between supervisors and supervisees in the field of construction quality risk management Backward induction was adopted to obtain the equilibrium solution; analysis on the solution demonstrates that the supervision potency dimension of supervisors has a direct influence on the construction quality. Adopting constrain and incentive measures is beneficial to improve the supervision potency dimension and prevent collusion behavior from happening; moderate supervision, the combination of supervision and incentive, is advantageous to the enhancement of supervisees working initiatives, reduction of collusion and guarantee construction quality.

关键词： Risk management on construction quality Collusion behavior Game analysis

作者: Deng JX Zhou J YuX

作者单位: School of Architecture and Civil Engineering,Xiamen University of China Engineering and Technology College, Hubei University of Technology of China School of Architecture and Civil Engineering, Xiamen University of China

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: 2010 International Symposium on Construction Economy and Management(2010年建筑经济与管理国际学术研讨会 SECEM2010)

会议地点: 深圳

会议语种:英文

页码: 176-180

在线出版日期: 2010-05-21（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）