Optimal Incentive Contract in SMEs Credit Market

摘要：

The asymmetric information between SMEs and banks can result in moral hazard in SMEs credit market in China. In order to reduce the moral hazard, this paper designs and analyzes incentive contract which can satisfy the participation constraint and incentive compatibility constraint of SMEs. The analysis result shows, by designing the interest rate and collateral value, banks can guide SMEs to invest the project that banks like, and the interest rate varies inversely with collateral value which means there is substitution effect between interest rate and collateral value for SMEs.

关键词： asymmetric information incentive contract small and medium-sized enterprise

作者: TAN Qingmei WU Jinke

作者单位: School of Management Tianjin UniversityTianjin, China School of Materials Science and Engineering Tianjin University Tianjin, China

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: 2010 2nd IEEE International Conference on Information Management and Engineering(2010年IEEE第二届信息管理与工程国际会议 IEEE ICIME 2010)

会议地点: 成都

会议语种:英文

页码: 1-3

在线出版日期: 2010-04-16（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）