A Study on Influence of Top Executive’s Pay Gap on Firm Performance

摘要：

Using the panel data of Chinese listed firms during 2001-2007, this paper investigates the incentive function of the top executive’s pay gap. The results show that the performance first increases and then decreases when the pay gap keeps increasing. When pay gap is small, the feeling of unfair is slight, so the incentive of pay gap exceeds the unfair feeling and the increase of pay gap will bring better performance. The tournament theory is in control. But when the pay gap is big enough, the unfair feeling will exceeds the incentive of pay gap, so the increase of pay gap will bring worse performance, and the behavior theory is in control.

关键词： pay gap firm performance tournament theory behavior theory

作者: LU Haifan

作者单位: Guangdong University of Foreign Studies,College of Finance and Economy,China,510006

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: 2010 International Conference on Technology Innovation and Industry Development(2010年技术创新与产业发展国际研讨会)

会议地点: 烟台

会议语种:英文

页码: 652-656

在线出版日期: 2010-09-17（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）