Research on the Effectiveness of Administration and Supervision on Overseas State-owned Assets of China
State-owned Multinational Corporation is a specific phenomenon in China.This paper analyzes the efficiency loss problem of administration and supervision on overseas state-owned assets of China,on the basis of principal-agency theory.The management system of state-owned assets such as state ownership,hierarchical management,authorized operations and supervision with a due division of labor has some defects in the unclear agency relationship,which cause some agency problems such as owner vacancy,owner offside and internal person control.Uncertainty of multinational operations strengthens the information asymmetry between the principal and the agent more obvious,which leads to serious losses of overseas state-owned assets.It brings forward a suggestion on strategy-oriented management system of investor,carrying out classified supervision and management on multinational corporations,as well as function-oriented assessment with performance assessment method of balanced scorecard introduced,so as to promote the value maintenance and appreciation of state-owned assets.
Multinational Corporation State-owned Assets Invalidity Principal-agency Theory
Guo Hong
Business college of Jianghan University,Wuhan,Hubei,China,430056
国际会议
西安
英文
490-499
2010-08-01(万方平台首次上网日期,不代表论文的发表时间)