Revenue-sharing Contract of Perishable Products Supply Chain With Effort Dependent Demand and Return
A supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer was considered in the paper,on the premise of retailers effort dependent demand and false return,the mathematical models of revenue-sharing contract with sales effort effects were established,and the impact of effort factor on supply chain coordination was analyzed.Through studies on traditional revenue sharing contract,the reasons of difficulty in supply chain coordination were explained,further pointing out that revenue-sharing contract based on rebate and penalty can carry out perishable products supply chain coordination,and then parameter method for optimal contract is proposed.Finally,a numerical example was given to illustrate the model and the solution process.
perishable products supply chain revenue-sharing contract rebate and penalty effort factor coordination
CAO Xiyu QU Aolin
Department of of Economic and Management,Zhong Shah Institute,University of Electronic Science and T Zhongshan Polytechnic,Zhongshan,Guangdong,P.R.China,528404
国际会议
The 3rd International Conference on Logistics and Supply Chain Management 2010(第三届物流与供应链管理国际研讨会)
长沙
英文
87-94
2010-07-18（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）