ASSET ALLOCATION FOR FUND OF FUNDS: AN INCENTIVE ANALYSIS
Asymmetric information leading to the moral hazard exists in the course of asset allocation for fund of funds. To reduce the conflict between the fund of funds manager and the venture capital fund manager and reduce the agency costs, we design an incentive mechanism to achieve those objectives. Through designing an optimal incentive contract, we find that the venture capital fund manager needs to invest personal capital and assume unlimited liability. We also design a reputation model and find that the fund of funds manager needs to take a mixed strategy to repeat the game with the venture capital fund manager.
Asset allocation Fund of funds Venture capital Incentive mechanism Repeated game
Zhang Chengyong Liu Manhong Guan Rui
Renmin University of China Boston Venture Capital Research Center, USA Peking University Ⅲ.Content Area Venture Capital Ⅳ.Methodological Area quantitative
国际会议
Academy of Innovation and Entrepreneurship 2010(2010创新与创业国际学术会议)
北京
英文
284-290
2010-07-09（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）