INFLUENCE OF INEQUITY AVERSION ON RANK-ORDER TOURNAMENT

摘要：

The rank-order tournament implements incentives with unfair payment. However, the inequity aversion that has been approved by a series of economic game experiments and by which any unfair allocation will result in disutility definitely, is ignored in the existing literatures While the traditional hypothesis of purely self-inter est is followed. By incorporating inequity aversion into the standard frame, this paper systematically analyses the influence of the inequity aversion on the incentive efficiency and the incentive structure of the rank-order tournament. It is found that the inequity aversion surely will reduce the incentive efficiency and thereby change the incentive structure. Therefore, in order to design an optimal rank-order tournament, the principal should screen and evaluate properly the strength of the inequity aversion of the relevant participators in advance, which is significant for enterprises to establish a efficient incentive system.

关键词： Inequity aversion Rank-order tournament Incentive efficiency Game theory

作者: Guangxing Wei Yanhong Qin

作者单位: School of Management, Chongqing Jiaotong University, Chongqing, 400074, China

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: The Ninth International Conference on Industrial Management(第九届工业管理国际会议 ICIM2008)

会议地点: 日本大阪

会议语种:英文

页码: 374-380

在线出版日期: 2008-09-16（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）