ON RISK INCENTIVE AND DEBT EXEMPTION

摘要：

Risk-shifting incentive problem in financial contracting, which typically arises in the context of a lender borrower relationship, stands for the borrower’s incentive to influence the risk of his project. Since the paper by Jensen & Meckling 1 was published enormous literature devoted to work of this field are observed. In this paper, we focus on not only borrowers risk incentive but lender s risk incentive problems and the relation between the both sides since lender s risk incentive may cause to accelerates the possibility of borrower s risk incentive. Thus, when either side even selects a risky project instead of a safe one the inefficiencies of resource distribution are developed. We analyze the incentive problem, in which, in particular, borrower has many investing projects and option pricing theory is used

关键词： Risk-shifting incentive Option pricing theory Debt exemption

作者: Masatoshi Miyake Yasuhiro Hirakawa Hiroshi Inoue

作者单位: Department of Industrial Administration,Tokyo University of Science, Noda, Chiba 278 -8510 Japan School of Management,Tokyo University of Science, Kuki, Saitama 346 - 8512 Japan

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: The Ninth International Conference on Industrial Management(第九届工业管理国际会议 ICIM2008)

会议地点: 日本大阪

会议语种:英文

页码: 451-456

在线出版日期: 2008-09-16（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）