Partner Choice of Dynamic Alliances Based on IPR Sharing

摘要：

Choosing good partner of IPR is prerequisite to enter into the dynamic alliances successfully. In this paper, a model for the adverse selection of IPR conflict in knowledge sharing is built on the imperfect asymmetric information game theory. The equilibrium conditions are analyzed in order to promote the participation of good partners and nonparticipation of poor partners in collaborative innovation. The relationship between the equilibrium conditions and various parameters are discussed, and solutions to the negative effect of the adverse selection are offered.

关键词： partner choice dynamic alliances IPR sharing

作者: QI Hong-mei MENG Hua-xing

作者单位: Management School,Xian Jiaotong University,China,710049 Management School,Hebei University of Economics & Business,Shijiazhuang,050011,Hebei,China

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: The Fourth International Conference on Management of Innovation and Technology(第四届技术管理与技术创新国际会议 ISMOT04)

会议地点: 杭州

会议语种:英文

页码: 533-537

在线出版日期: 2004-10-24（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）