Entrepreneur Team in Venture Business
Division of labor and specialization in venture entrepreneur team play great influences upon the distribution of the output. This paper, with a Stackelberg game model, analyzes the distribution between entrepreneurs and venture capitalists. The entrepreneur devotes capital and endeavor, thus the incentive system in the contract correspondingly includes stock bonus and endeavor profits. The devotion sequence is distinctive, and affects both the output and the belief.Equilibrium devotion and output are improved under the circumstances of the team than that under the mono-agent, due to division of labor. The behavior of free riding is lessened, partly represented as the optimizing of the investment. The investor also would like to devote more, and pays more to the entrepreneurs. The founding of team helps to avoid the substitution between the high wage rate and the high stock return. Furthermore, there may exists a kind of risk attitude interplay effect between venture entrepreneurs and venture capitalists.
venture entrepreneur team stackelberg game venture capitalist free riding risk attitude interplay effect
ZHAO Yan ZHOU Wen CHEN Xiao-jian
Sydney Institute of Language and Commerce,Shanghai University,Shanghai,P.R.China Computer Science Dept,Shanghai University, Shanghai,P.R.China School of Business,University of Science and Technology of China Hefei,Anhui,P.R.China
国际会议
杭州
英文
696-700
2004-10-24（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）