Optimal Road Congestion Pricing Based on Game Theory

摘要：

Based on the previous research, this paper presents a parameterized congestion pricing schemes with user’s behavior characterized by the theory of stochastic users’ equilibrium. The congestion pricing schemes is considered as a game between road users and administrator, and each player has the optimal objectives. Therefore, a bi-level program is employed with the upper-level evaluating of proximity between a Nash bargaining solution and the ideal solution, and the lower-level is the stochastic users’ equilibrium. The model is solved by genetic algorithm. The proposed model is illustrated that it is hard to reduce the pseudo remaining congestion by increasing the pricing when it comes to level.

关键词： Road Congestion Pricing Game Theory Bi-level Program Genetic algorithm

作者: Yuanzhou Yang Shaokuan Chen Rong Huang Xiao Liang Baohua Mao

作者单位: MOE Key Laboratory for Urban Transportation Complex Systems Theory and Technology, Beijing Jiaotong MOE Key Laboratory for Urban Transportation Complex Systems Theory and Technology, Beijing Jiaotong

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: The 22nd China Control and Decision Conference(2010年中国控制与决策会议)

会议地点: 徐州

会议语种:英文

页码: 4186-4189

在线出版日期: 2010-05-26（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）