Joint Pricing-Production Quantity Decision Under Consignment Contract With Revenue Sharing When Manufacturing Cost Is Asymmetric
In a two-echelon supply chain under consignment contract with revenue sharing, firstly, the manufacturer reports his manufacturing cost to the retailer; secondly, for each item sold, the retailer deducts a percentage from the selling price and remits the balance to the supplier according to the manufacturer s manufacturing cost reported; thirdly, the supplier decides on the retail price and delivery quantity for his product, and retains ownership of the goods. To maximize her own profit, the manufacturer will misreport his manufacturing cost for asymmetric information. In this paper we show that there is a unique solution in equilibrium. Those elegant analytical results allowed us to know how the supplier decides on the retail price and delivery quantity for his product. From our research, we also know how the suppliers decision changes with system parameters.
Misreporting Consignment Contract Revenue Sharing Supply Chain Management Asymmetric information
Dan Li Jiafu Tang
School of Information Science and Engineering, Northeastern University, Shenyang, 110004,China Schoo School of Information Science and Engineering, Northeastern University, Shenyang, 110004,China
国际会议
The 22nd China Control and Decision Conference(2010年中国控制与决策会议)
徐州
英文
1339-1344
2010-05-26（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）