Quality Supervision in Logistics Service Supply Chain under Asymmetric Information Based on Game Theory
Research on quality supervision in logistics service supply chain under asymmetric information can not only enlarge the theory of logistics service supply chain but also provide guidance for business practice. A Bayesian Nash equilibrium model under asymmetric information is established based on a basic model of quality supervision in logistics service supply chain under symmetric information and an equilibrium result is obtained, then the influence on quality supervision is considered after a factor of competition between logistics service suppliers is introduced and a new result of the Bayesian Nash equilibrium is got. Simulation results show that the quality completion level of supplier rises up and the quality supervision level of integrator brings down after the factor is introduced. Therefore, in practice, the level of logistics service can be improved effectively and the overall quality of logistics services supply chain can be enhanced through strengthening the competition between logistics service suppliers.
Logistics Service Supply Chain Quality Supervision Asymmetric Information Bayesian Nash Equilibrium
Shizhen Bai Lin Zhang
School of Management, Harbin University of Commerce, Harbin 150076, China
国际会议
The 22nd China Control and Decision Conference(2010年中国控制与决策会议)
徐州
英文
1345-1350
2010-05-26（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）