Analysis of Moral Hazard in Virtual Enterprise Based on Probability Constraints
In this paper, the moral hazard in Virtual Enterprise (VE) is studied based on the principal-agent theory with probability constraints. The probability is used to quantify the partners’ risk attitude in VE, and the principal-agent model under probability constraint is used to deal with the problem. Firstly, the probability constraints is used to modify the participation constraints of the traditional principal-agent model, then the model is solved and the optimality decision is analysed, which shows the usefulness and effectiveness of the model.
Virtual Enterprise Moral Hazard Probability Constraints Principal-agent
Guike Chen Min Huang Wai-Ki Ching
College of Information Science and Engineering, Northeastern University, Shenyang, Liaoning, 110004, The University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong
国际会议
The 22nd China Control and Decision Conference(2010年中国控制与决策会议)
徐州
英文
1370-1373
2010-05-26（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）