Research on Trilateral Game among Owner, Contractor and Engineering Supervisor in Communication Construction Market

摘要：

This paper combines principal-agent theory with rent-seeking theory, comprehensively analyzes the relationships among owner, supervisor and contractor, utilizes game theory to establish the model of owners, supervisor and contractor, and analyzes the game behavior or rent-seeking between supervisor and contractor. This paper adds the long-term economic benefits and reputation of supervisor and contractor into the tripartite game model, and proposes some constructive comments.

关键词： Rent-seeking Risk Management Trilateral Game Communication Construction market

作者: Yumei Zhao Rong Hua Xiaodong Zhang Yaxian Li

作者单位: School of Economics and Management, Beijing University of Posts&Telecommunications, Beijing, 100876

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: The 22nd China Control and Decision Conference(2010年中国控制与决策会议)

会议地点: 徐州

会议语种:英文

页码: 2371-2374

在线出版日期: 2010-05-26（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）