A Game Analysis on Bank-Enterprise Credit Contract

摘要：

This article thinks of the influence of integrity and trust degree, takes the integrity factor as decisive variable to establish the credit risk decision-making model, then provides the credit loan risk decision mechanism and effect mechanism which has the integrity variable under the condition that the bank and the enterprise are integrity from the bank aspect of maximum expected income. And analyses respectively one-time and multi-time credit game, determines the quantitative relationship with integrity degree, the minimum trust-in degree benchmark for credit agreement and cooperation period.

关键词： Credit game theory Bank-Enterprise Credit Agreement Credit Contract Game model

作者: Yanbing Zhang Jianbo Liu Yanyan Zhang

作者单位: School of Business Administration, Northeastern University, Shenyang, 110004, China Northeastern University at Qinhuangdao, Qinhuangdao, 066004, China

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: The 22nd China Control and Decision Conference(2010年中国控制与决策会议)

会议地点: 徐州

会议语种:英文

页码: 654-657

在线出版日期: 2010-05-26（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）