The Optimal Procurement Contract of E-literature in University Library
This paper analyzes the principal-agent relationship of electronic literature procurement in university library, and establishes a principal-agent model between an university library and an e-literature provider. By means of the derivation and analysis of the equilibrium of the model, we find that the optimal contract of the procurement of eliterature is a basic fixed fee plus a deducting percentage of the services value. In practice, in order to develop a reasonable basic fixed fee, an university library should establish a scientific evaluation index system about procurement costs and working costs of the e-literature providers;in the meantime, let eliterature providers to share some service value of e-literature by the way of commission coefficients, so as to resulte in incentive effect and avoid the problems of active promotion, negative response and low utilization of e-literature resulting from a simple fixed annual payment of e-literature.
Theory principal-agent E-literature procurement Optimal contract
ZHANG Xin
Library of Jimei University, Xiamen, Fujian, P.R.China, 361021
国际会议
成都
英文
725-730
2010-05-21（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）