A Repeated Game Analysis on Bank-Enterprise Credit Contract

摘要：

Under certain condition, establishes the integrity decision-making model of credit loan contract & agreement between bank and enterprise, point out that this model is a repeated game model whose fundamental game is the one time dynamic game, in the one time game both sides make decision alternately, but the social benefit and individual interest cannot be maximized; For repeated game model, deduce the trust base line of financing enterprise and investors, thereby give a trigger strategy, and this strategy is a Nash equilibrium with perfect sub-game.

关键词： Credit and Loan Repeated Game Decision Making Model Nash Equilibrium

作者: Liu Jianbo Wang Xianliang Ren Rongrong Yang Jingfei

作者单位: Northeastern University at Qinhuangdao, Qinhuangdao, Hebei, 066004, China Tangshan Teachers College, Tangshan, Hebei, 063000, China

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: 2010 International Conference on Intelligent Computation Technology and Automation(2010 智能计算技术与自动化国际会议 ICICTA 2010)

会议地点: 长沙

会议语种:英文

页码: 310-313

在线出版日期: 2010-05-11（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）