A Signal Game Theory Based Reputation Model of Supply Chain of Medicine Retail Enterprises
In order to improve the service offered by the medicine retail enterprises, game theory is utilized to analyze the customers relationships and the reputation of supply chain enterprises. Equilibrium strategies in the signaling game of catering enterprises and customers are studied theoretically. The reputation model of the supply chain enterprises is built. The reputation of supply chain influenced the judgment of customers and the profit of enterprises directly. When the cost that reduced by the establishment of reputation is greater than the maintenance cost for the catering supply chain, the game between the catering supply chain and customers will bring profit to both sides.
Medicine Retail Enterprises Supply Chain Reputation Signal Game Theory
Yue Shumei Guo Qiujun Guo Weijie
Institute of Chinese Medicine, Henan University, Kaifeng, China School of Public Administration & Department of Control Science and Engineering, Huazhong University
国际会议
长沙
英文
343-346
2010-05-11（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）