Study of Supply Chain Contract Design under Uncertain Demand

摘要：

Under the perspective of distributor as principle, this paper set up a basic model to study the principle-agent problem between distributor and manufactures in a supply chain with the condition of stochastic demand and asymmetric information. It is fund that asymmetric information damages the distributors expected profit, but by method of changing some specific supply chain contract parameters, the distributor can effectively screen signals and optimize its profit. At the end, the effectiveness of the model was validated by a simple case simulation.

关键词： Supply Chain Adverse selection Uncertain demand

作者: Jia Weiying Liu Yongsheng Zhang Jian

作者单位: Beijing Wuzi University, Beijing, 101149,China

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: 2010 International Conference on Intelligent Computation Technology and Automation(2010 智能计算技术与自动化国际会议 ICICTA 2010)

会议地点: 长沙

会议语种:英文

页码: 2809-2812

在线出版日期: 2010-05-11（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）