VMI Coordination Based on Price Subsidiary Mechanism under Exogenous Price

摘要：

As is exogenous variable, we put forward the price subsidiary mechanisms of traditional model, Stackelberg model and Hash negothttion models to eoordinate VML Under the price subaudiary meehanism, the numeric examples show the tradJtiomd VMI coordination model isnt reasonable. The VMI coordination of Stackelberg game model cant get optimal expected benefit of the integrated supply chain, but can improve the benefit of retailer and supplier. The VMI coordination of Nash Negotiation model can not only get optimal expected benefit of the integrated supply chain, but can improve the benefit of retailer and supplier greatly, so it can perfectly coordinate decentralized VML.

关键词： Vendor Managed Inventory Coordination Price Subsidiary Medchanism Stackelberg Game Model Nash Negotiation Model

作者: LIU Peng-fei YU Pan-pan XIAO Wen-zhong

作者单位: School of Economic and Management,Changsha University of Science & Technology,Hunan, Changsha410004, School of Transport and Transportation Engineering,Central South University,Changsha 410075, China

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: 2010 International Conference on Intelligent Computation Technology and Automation(2010 智能计算技术与自动化国际会议 ICICTA 2010)

会议地点: 长沙

会议语种:英文

页码: 3509-3512

在线出版日期: 2010-05-11（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）