Incomplete Information Dynamic Games Analysis Between Coal Mine Owners and Local Government on the Supervision of Coal Mine Safety Production in China
In accordance with the information asymmetry during disposal of coal mine safety production in China, we establish three incomplete information dynamic game models involving local government supervision departments and coal mine owners, and then give their subgame refined Bayesian Nash equilibrium respectively. The result shows that it cant effectively reduce the illegal exploitation phenomenon only by punishing of illegal exploitation behavior or awarding of supervision behavior, while only by means of general encouraging to different supervision behavior during punishment of illegal exploitation behavior, can improve disposal effect and effectively prevent illegal exploitation behavior. At last, it puts forwards some advices for the reinforcement of coal mine safe production and the perfection management which made the two parties in equilibrium based on the result for the model.
Coal Mine Safety Production Supervision Incomplete Information Dynamic Game Subgame Refined Bayesian Nash Equilibrium
Yan Chun Liu Xinmin
College of Information Science and Engineering, Shandong University of Science and Technology (SDUST College of Economics and Management, Shandong University of Science and Technology (SDUST), Qingdao
国际会议
重庆
英文
1318-1321
2009-12-25（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）