An Inquiry into Impacts about Periods and Precision of Noises in Career-Concerns Incentive
Periods of career cycle and output noises influence a principal, an agent and total surplus in career-Concerns Incentive. First, in the T-period career cycle, the agents effort is the most in early stages and is descending with the timing of moves; in the end his effort is zero. Second, there are more the agents effort and output if there are more periods in the career cycle, and it exists the optimal periods for the most efficiency. Third, the principals payoff is increasing with the agents effort increase in t period, which is better off in early stages but worse off in later stages; the agents expected payoff and total surplus show the different changing characters with the timing of moves under the different conditions. Fourth, if precision increases, the agents effort and the principals expected payoff increases; But the agents expected payoff and total surplus take on the different changing characters with precision changes on the different conditions. In the end the career-concerns model is compared with formal contracts and relational contracts.
periods precision, career-Concerns model contracts
BAI Peiwen
School of Economics, Xiamen University, P.R.China, 361005
国际会议
2009 International Forum of Human Resource Strategy and Development(2009人力资源战略与开发国际高层论坛)
济南
英文
291-297
2009-10-24（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）