Analysis of Residual Claim Design of Knowledge Enterprise from Games Theory

摘要：

With the great importance of knowledge, it is necessary for enterprise efficiency to design residual Claim. But inequality to stakeholder in residual controlling right brings about different results. It is possible for controlling stakeholders to transfer enterprise interest to own and impossible for other stakeholders. But some stakeholders with certain proportions of residual claim have incentive to monitor controlling stakeholders activities. So it is essential to option residual claim design to achieve incentive compatibility between them.

关键词： Residual Claim Knowledge enterprise Incentive compatibility

作者: NI Huijun

作者单位: Management School, Shandong Electric research institute, Jinan, China 250010

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: 2009 International Forum of Human Resource Strategy and Development(2009人力资源战略与开发国际高层论坛)

会议地点: 济南

会议语种:英文

页码: 994-999

在线出版日期: 2009-10-24（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）