Analysis Of the Bargain Power Under Clean Development Mechanism With Game Theory
According to the problem of the Chineses enterprises poor bargaining power of CERs under CDM mechanism, we used the game theory to analyze the reason why the Chinese enterprises bargain power is so weak and why they stay on the low level of the value chain. The game model first compared the market share and the CERs deal price in the individual negotiation condition with and without the CERs trading. And then discussed the CERs deal price in the alliance condition. The result shows that the alliance of the Chinese enterprises will enhance their bargain power in the CDM mechanism and supports the necessity of establishing carbon exchange mechanism in China.
CDM CERs bargain power alliance game theory
Yan Xia Zhongchun Mi
School of Management University of Science and Technology of China Hefei, China
国际会议
长沙
英文
1937-1939
2009-10-10（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）