Coordination for product returns rapid transportation
In the manufacturer-TPL supply chain, manufacturer outsourced the reverse logistics works to a TPL. The quicker TPL transport the product returns, the less of the invalid returns. Under the simple piece-rate contract, TPL makes the transportation decision to maximize his own expected profit. The equilibrium transportation speed under such contract is slower than the supply chains optimal speed. In this paper, we introduce a punishment mechanism into the piece-rate contract, which not only pay for transported returns, but also punish for the invalid returns. We show that this contract can achieve channel coordination and a win-win outcome for both manufacture and TPL.
Supply chain coordination Supply chain contracts Rapid transportation Product returns
Li Mingfang Li Guochang
School of Economics & Management Hebei University of Science and Technology Shijiazhuang, China
国际会议
长沙
英文
2463-2467
2009-10-10（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）