Reputation model of supply chain based on the game of catering enterprises and customers
The judgment of customers and the profit of catering enterprises are influenced by the reputation of the supply chain. We analyzed the relationship of catering enterprises and customers, and the reputation of enterprises in the supply chain using game theory. Equilibrium strategies in the signaling game of catering enterprises and customers are studied theoretically. The reputation model of enterprises in the supply chain is built. When the cost that reduced by the establishment of reputation is greater than the maintenance cost for the catering supply chain, the game between the catering supply chain and customers will bring profit to both sides.
supply chain catering enterprise reputation signaling game
Guo Wei-jie Qi Huan Guo Qiu-jun
Department of Control Science and Engineering Huazhong University of Science and Technology Whuhan, School of Public Administration Huazhong University of Science and Technology Whuhan, China
国际会议
长沙
英文
2882-2884
2009-10-10（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）