Ordering and Revenue in Sequential Auctions: A Natural Experiment from the Market for Art

摘要：

We estimate the effect of ordering by value on revenues in sequential auctions using data from art auctions of Old Masters by Sotheby’s and Christies’ from 1985 to 2004. Sotheby’s and Christie’s agreed years ago to alternate between who holds their auction first during auction week in New York City. Since the same buyers attend both auctions, we use this pre-determined rotation as a natural experiment to identify the effect of ordering on revenues. We find that the total revenue of the two auctions during auction week is higher when the house with the most expensive paintings goes first during the week. These findings are consistent with a number of theories which predict that it is optimal to auction off expensive items first in sequential auctions of goods of heterogeneous value.

作者: Harrison Hong Ilan Kremer Jeffrey Kubik Jianping Mei Michael Moses

作者单位: Princeton University Stanford University Syracuse University New York University

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: 2009年中国金融国际年会

会议地点: 广州

会议语种:英文

页码: 1-44

在线出版日期: 2009-07-07（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）