Prop Ups During Lockups

摘要：

The end of the lockup period of initial public offerings generally constitutes the first time corporate insiders sell significant numbers of shares on the market. I test the hypothesis that shareholders pressure analysts to support the share price until the end of the lockup period. In a sample of U.S. initial public offerings from 1996 up to 2006, I find that analysts issue overly optimistic recommendations until the end of the lockup period. Furthermore, I find a significant downward revision of recommendations for the whole sample of firms as soon as the lockup period ends.

关键词： booster shots lockup period analyst behavior

作者: Jens Martin

作者单位: Swiss Finance Institute, University of Lugano, Via Giuseppe Buffi 13, CH-6904 Lugano, Switzerland

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: 2009年中国金融国际年会

会议地点: 广州

会议语种:英文

页码: 1-51

在线出版日期: 2009-07-07（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）