Corporate Reputation Signaling Restrains Adverse Selection of Alliance Partners by Game Analysis

摘要：

The adverse selection among alliance partners is an important reasons which leads the alliance failure,and asymmetric information between enterprises is the key to result in adverse selection. Therefore,reducing the degree of information asymmetry will help reduce the risk of failure. Corporate reputation that has the signaling function may reveal inherent characteristics of the enter prise. Game analysis shows that the reputation of alliance partners can lead to a separating equilibrium,that is,the leader enterprise can select the right alliance partner by judging the reputation of potential partners. Thus,it may restrain the adverse selection of alliance and improve the efficiency of strategic alliances in certain extent.

关键词： corporate reputation signaling affiliates adverse selection

作者: FU Jialin

作者单位: School of Economics and Management,Zhengzhou University of Light Industry,P. R. China

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: Zhengzhou Conference Conference on Management of Technology(2009郑州技术管理研讨会 MOT2009)

会议地点: 郑州

会议语种:英文

页码: 149-151

在线出版日期: 2009-04-17（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）