The Signaling Game Analysis of Commercial Bank Recruitment Customer Manager

摘要：

With the ongoing of socialist market economic system, the introduction of Customer Manager System has be come inner demand of reform and development of com mercial banks. Customer Manager is the core of Custom er Manager System,commercial banks should choose suitable Customer Management in the light of their own development needs. The recruitment is the first step of choosing Customer Manager,because of information a symmetry and imperfection,the recruitment market will appear the following four different market equilibriums, namely success,partial success,partial failure and fail me. Among them,only market success is the most ideal and efficient equilibrium. Through implementing a pro bationary period and designing a reasonable compensa tion,increasing packaging costs and penalties costs,we can achieve a completely successful market equilibri gins.

关键词： Customer management recruitment information asymmetry signaling game equilibriums analysis

作者: WU Zongfa WANG Chunyu

作者单位: School of Economies and Management,Tongji University,P. R. China

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: Zhengzhou Conference Conference on Management of Technology(2009郑州技术管理研讨会 MOT2009)

会议地点: 郑州

会议语种:英文

页码: 730-734

在线出版日期: 2009-04-17（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）