Self-interests or Win-win Policy for Top Executive Compensation Contract:From the Perspective of New-classical Economics

摘要：

This paper studies the relation between corporate scale and top executive compensation. There is significantly positive elasticity between compensation and corporate scale. Moreover, corporate perform ance is positively related to the elasticity of compensation and scale. We find that both agency theory and managerialism hold true in Chinese lis ted companies. Compensation contract is significantly influenced by stockholders and managers.

作者: Chen Zhen Wang Xin

作者单位: School of Accounting, Zhongnan University of Finance and Law School of Accounting, Central University of Finance and Economics

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: 2008 Sino-Australia International Conference on Accounting and Finance(2008中澳会计与财务国际学术研讨会)

会议地点: 武汉

会议语种:英文

页码: 120-135

在线出版日期: 2008-10-31（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）