Study of Externality Controlling Model in Principal-Agent
Described value functions under outsourcing model of administrator giving pollution controlling business to pollution releasing enterprise in externality controlling, and analyzed externality decisions under different information conditions. Under asymmetric information condition, administrator as principal, the enterprise as agent, established outsourcings pollution controlling quality evaluation principal agent model. Consider the situation of the enterprises pollution controlling level was bided, used maximum value axiom derived optimal solutions of administrators quality evaluation and transfer payment, contrasted results under different information environment. Then, simulation calculation tested and verified analysis result.
Wang Li-na Cheng Chun-mei Li Tong-yu
School of Economics Management, Liaoning University of Technology, Jinzhou, 121001, Liaoning Province, China
国际会议
长沙
英文
2113-2116
2008-10-20（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）