Managerial Promotions: The Determinants and Incentive Effects
Using executive position and compensation data, we examine the promotion events in which corporate executives are internally appointed as the chief executive officer (CEO). We first identify factors affecting the firms promotion decision, and find that executive attributes and the incumbent-CEO influence present the most important factors. Firm characteristics such as size and performance are relevant but less important. We then examine the incentive effect of the promotions. Consistent with Gibbons and Murphys (1992, this journal) theory of optimal incentive contracts with career concerns, we document a strong substitution relationship between executive pay-performance sensitivities and promotion opportunities.
Promotions incentive contracts managerial career concerns
Rujing Meng Xianming Zhou
School of Economics and Finance,University of Hong Kong,Pokfulam Road,Hong Kong School of Economics and Finance,The University of Hong Kong,Pokfulam Road,Hong Kong
国际会议
大连
英文
1-46
2008-07-02（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）