Investor Protection and the Mode of Acquisition: An Implication for the Formation of Pyramids
This paper investigates whether the level of investor protection affects the choice between a full scale merger and a purchase of a controlling stake in an acquisition, and examines the consequences of these decisions on target shareholders welfare. Using a sample of 10,402 acquisitions from 38 countries between 1990 and 2003, I find that targets from countries with poor investor protection are more likely to be acquired through a control stake acquisition than a merger thereby creating inter-corporate control chains. The returns to target minority shareholders in low protection countries are significantly positive in both control stake acquisitions and mergers, but they are substantially lower than those found in countries with high investor protection.
国际会议
大连
英文
1-38
2008-07-02（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）