Doom or gloom? CEO stock options after Enron
This study finds a significant and pervasive decline but not an elimination of CEO option-based compensation after the corporate governance scandals around 2000-2001 centered on executive option compensation. Some, but not all, of the drop is predicted by changes in the characteristics of firms, CEOs, boards of directors, and markets. In the cross-section, the change in CEO options is positively related to firm size, growth opportunities, cash flows, ownership by large pension funds, and CEO experience and negatively related to firm age, board size, and fair value expensing of options. The findings provide significant support for the hypothesis that CEO options are affected by optimal contracting considerations and some support for the hypothesis that differences in perceived and actual costs of CEO options are important. We find no independent support for the hypothesis that CEO power is a significant determinant of CEO option-based compensation.
Executive stock options Executive compensation Corporate governance
Suman Banerjee Vladimir A. Gatchev Thomas H. Noe
A.B.Freeman School of Business,Tulane University 7 McAlister Drive,New Orleans,LA 70118 Department of Finance,College of Business Administration University of Central Florida,Orlando,FL 32
国际会议
大连
英文
1-47
2008-07-02（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）