Financing-Motivated Takeovers: The Case of China
In Chinas state-dominated financial system, many firms, especially non-state-owned or private firms, face serious restrictions in gaining access to bank and equity market financing. This kind of highly discriminatory financial repression policy regime nurtures financing-motivated acquisitions in which non-listed firms, especially privately owned firms, make use of the acquisition of block shares in listed firms as a means of gaining access to the formal financial system. Post-acquisition financing activities, however, do not seem to improve corporate operational performance. The negative impacts of post-acquisition financing activities are particularly significant for state-acquired financing firms. In fact, they show more salient symptoms of tunneling, which are reflected in fund occupation by the controlling acquiring shareholder, and unusual dividend payout. They also display patterns of inefficient investment, demonstrated by slower growth in long-term investments and the net cash flow generated from investments.
Julan Du Oliver M. Rui Sonia M.L. Wong
Chinese University of Hong Kong Lingnan University
国际会议
大连
英文
1-53
2008-07-02（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）