Agency Problems at Dual-Class Companies

摘要：

We use a sample of U.S. dual-class companies to examine how the divergence between insider voting rights and cash-flow rights affects managerial extraction of private benefits of control. We find that as the divergence widens at dual-class companies, corporate cash holdings are worth less to outside shareholders, CEOs receive higher levels of compensation, managers are more likely to make shareholder-value destroying acquisitions, and capital expenditures contribute less to shareholder value. These findings support the hypothesis that managers with greater control rights in excess of cash-flow rights are prone to waste corporate resources to pursue private benefits at the expense of shareholders. As such, they contribute to our understanding of why firm value is decreasing in the insider control-cash flow rights divergence.

作者: Ronald W. Masulis Cong Wang Fei Xie

作者单位: Owen Graduate School of Management,Vanderbilt University Faculty of Business Administration,Chinese University of Hong Kong School of Management,George Mason University

会议类型: 国际会议

会议名称: 2008年中国金融国际年会

会议地点: 大连

会议语种:英文

页码: 1-51

在线出版日期: 2008-07-02（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）