US Barbarians at the Japan Gate: Cross Border Hedge Fund Activism
We investigate causes and consequences of the emerging shareholder hostility in Japan. Steel Partners, an activist hedge fund based in San Francisco, takes big stakes in more than 30 Japanese firms and pushes for strategic changes and sometimes tries to gain control of whole businesses. Meanwhile, Murakami Fund, a fresh Japanese activist fund, targets more than 40 firms. Steel Partners targets typically have more cash but lower market valuations, whereas Murakami Fund is more likely to target cash-rich firms only. Targets exhibit abnormal returns of about 5％ around the announcement of activist investors taking large stakes. We find that the stock market responses more favorably when targets have more cash and lower market valuations. In addition, the stock market seems to evaluate Steel Partners track record to create a shareholder value. Our evidence is in support of free cash flow hypothesis.
Activist Fund Shareholder Hostility Free Cash Flow Corporate Governance
Konari Uchida Peng Xu
The University of Kitakyushu Department of Economics,Hosei University,Aihara-Machi 4342,Machida-shi,Tokyo,194-0298,Japan
国际会议
大连
英文
1-34
2008-07-02（万方平台首次上网日期，不代表论文的发表时间）